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 Abstract 
In this study, we estimate empirically the multiple benefits of a subsidy policy that 
would offer payments to farmers in return for the adoption of conservation tillage and 
compare the outcomes of alternative targeting designs for such a policy. Using data for 
roughly 12,000 National Resource Inventory (NRI) points, we simulate for the state of 
Iowa the least-cost policy schemes for offering payment incentives. We use an economic 
model of conservation tillage adoption to evaluate the costs of adoption, and we use a 
model that simulates physical processes (Environmental Policy Integrated Climate, or 
EPIC) to estimate the environmental benefits of adoption at each of the NRI points.  
We assess the costs and environmental consequences of two targeting options. The 
first is a practice-based policy instrument that maximizes the acres of land in 
conservation tillage, regardless of the level of environmental benefits achieved. The 
second is a performance-based instrument that yields the highest amount of 
environmental benefits per dollar spent. We consider four performance-based benefits: 
carbon sequestration in agricultural soils, reduction in nitrogen runoff, reduction of 
erosion of soil by wind, and reduction of erosion of soil by water. We find that the 
practice-based instrument provides high proportions of the four benefits relative to the 
performance-based instrument, especially at higher budget levels. Similarly, we estimate 
that targeting one of the four benefits provides high percentages of the other benefits 
compared to the amounts obtainable if they were targeted directly. 
 
Keywords: conservation tillage, multiple benefits, subsidy policy, targeting. 
  
 
 
MULTIPLE BENEFITS OF CARBON-FRIENDLY AGRICULTURAL 
PRACTICES: EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF  
CONSERVATION TILLAGE 
The prospect of sequestering carbon in agricultural soils has generated substantial 
interest both in the scientific community and among policymakers. Lal et al. (1998) 
estimate the physical potential of U.S. cropland to sequester carbon at between 75 and 
208 million metric tons of carbon per year. This physical potential cannot be realized, 
however, without policies that take into consideration farmers’ profit motives. Policies 
under discussion include formal carbon markets and direct incentive payments (subsidies) 
to farmers through a government program.  
A subsidy program might be offered under the auspices of the Conservation Security 
Program (CSP), a key conservation feature of the 2002 Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act. Under the CSP, farmers are paid for the adoption of environmentally 
friendly practices such as conservation tillage. This subsidy policy could be designed to 
cost-effectively induce adoption of conservation tillage if, for example, a bid mechanism 
similar to that used for the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) were employed. 
However, while such a policy might yield the least-cost adoption of the practice of 
conservation tillage, it is not necessarily efficient for the provision of environmental 
benefits, as farmers are paid for practices as opposed to the resulting environmental 
benefits. To the extent that different farms yield different environmental benefits because 
of differing soil and land characteristics, a more efficient policy would target areas that 
are more environmentally sensitive.  
In this paper, we compare the least-cost policy design based on practice, which we 
simply refer to as the practice-based policy, to a more efficient alternative, which we call 
the performance-based policy. The performance-based policy would still pay for the 
adoption of the practice, but it would target it toward the environmental benefit by 
offering the subsidy first to the producers that can provide the highest amount of benefit 
per dollar spent (until the policy budget is exhausted).  
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In addition to carbon sequestration benefits, conservation tillage can generate a range 
of positive environmental externalities related to soils, water quality, and wildlife habitat. 
Recent research has provided estimates of these benefits under varying scenarios of 
adoption (e.g., Baylis et al. 2002). However, relatively little information exists on the 
costs of attaining these benefits or on which policies are best for achieving environmental 
goals. Our study aims to fill part of this gap by evaluating the multiple benefits from 
adoption of conservation tillage.  
Given the multiple benefits of conservation tillage adoption, a performance-based 
policy can be based on different environmental indicators. For example, a policymaker 
might pay farmers for their contribution to reduced soil erosion. In this case, carbon 
sequestration, as well as the other environmental benefits, could be thought of as a co-
benefit, and an important question is how efficient a soil-erosion-based performance 
policy is for carbon sequestration. That is, if a subsidy policy that targets reduction of soil 
erosion is implemented, how much less carbon is sequestered than if carbon sequestration 
were targeted directly? Or, alternatively, if a policy that targets carbon sequestration is 
implemented, how much less nitrogen runoff reduction is achieved than if nitrogen 
reductions were targeted?  
The objective of this paper is to estimate empirically the multiple benefits of the 
practice-based policy as well as the performance-based policy that target such 
environmental benefits as carbon sequestration, reduction of soil erosion by wind and by 
water, and nitrogen runoff reduction. These policy schemes are simulated for the state of 
Iowa using data for some 12,000 National Resource Inventory (NRI) points (Nusser and 
Goebel 1997). We use an economic model of adoption of conservation tillage to evaluate 
the costs of adoption. To estimate the environmental benefits, we use a model that 
simulates physical processes to calculate the changes in nitrogen runoff, soil erosion, and 
soil carbon accumulation in response to the adoption of conservation tillage at each of the 
NRI points.  
In practice, there will be a trade-off between the practice-based policy and the more 
efficient performance-based policy in terms of costs of implementation. Specifically, the 
practice-based policy should have relatively smaller costs of measuring and monitoring 
compliance whereas the performance-based policy is likely to have higher implementa-
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tion costs. While the existence of this trade-off is well understood, evaluation of its 
magnitude is an empirical question that has received little attention in the literature on 
carbon sequestration in agricultural soils. Antle et al. (2003) evaluate the relative costs of 
practice-based versus benefit-based policies in the context of a policy that pays for a 
change in cropping systems in grain-producing regions of Montana. In the conservation 
tillage context, Pautsch et al. (2001) partially evaluated the trade-off by comparing a 
performance-based policy to a policy that offers the same per-acre subsidy to all adopters 
(and as such is not the least-cost practice-based policy).  
In the next section, we present a theoretical model of alternatives for the design of 
subsidy policies, followed by a discussion of the empirical models and the data used in 
the analysis. We proceed with estimation of environmental benefits for a practice-based 
policy, followed by the study of relative efficiencies of alternative policy designs for 
targeting environmental benefits.  
 
Methods 
Alternative Policy Designs for Targeting Benefits 
To model the subsidy policy, suppose there are N farms, indexed by 1,...,n N= , and 
there are K environmental amenities, indexed by 1,...,k K= . For simplicity, we assume 
that all farms are of equal size, normalized to one, and the land on a particular farm is 
homogenous. Given a subsidy of nC , farm n adopts conservation tillage with 
probability ( )n np C , and the environmental improvements from the adoption 
are 1( ,..., )Kn n nX X X= . We assume that the policymaker knows the adoption probability 
function ( )np i  (through, for example, estimating farm n’s bid in a program similar to 
CRP sign-ups) and focus on possible least-cost incentives for the design of payment 
policies. 
First, consider the practice-based policy that targets conservation tillage without 
regard to its environmental benefits. That is, given a total budgetC , the policymaker 
wishes to maximize the expected amount of land in conservation tillage by providing 
subsidy nC  to farm n : 
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Notice that the objective function measures the expected acreage enrolled because 
each farm is normalized to have one acre of land. Also, the total amount of land in 
conservation tillage expected without the subsidy is subtracted from the total amount of 
land in conservation tillage expected with the subsidy. This allows for a more precise 
evaluation of the policy effect on adoption. However, consistent with the provisions of 
the CSP (U.S. Congress 2002), we assume that payments will be provided to all 
producers, both current and new. The budget constraint requires that the expected total 
cost cannot exceed budgetC . 
Let λ  be the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the cost constraint. The 
optimality conditions are 
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Depending on the adoption probability function, some farms may receive zero 
subsidies (i.e., 0nC = ), and some farms may enroll with zero probabilities. 
If the policymaker wishes to maximize the expected aggregate amount of the kth 
environmental amenity from the program, then the problem is  
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Let kλ  be the associated Lagrangian multiplier, then the optimal solution is 
characterized by  
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Comparing (4) with (2), we see that, by weighting the adoption probability with 
benefit knX , the optimal subsidy to farm n  will be higher as 
k
nX  increases. Again, farms 
providing low levels of the kth amenity may receive no subsidy or may enroll with zero 
probability. 
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If the farms are heterogeneous in the environmental benefits from adoption of 
conservation tillage, then the optimal subsidy levels in the two programs will differ. Also, 
the optimal subsidy levels possibly may differ depending on which of the benefits is 
targeted. The environmental benefits from alternative targeting schemes will be less 
different as the farms become more homogeneous in nX . In the extreme, if all farms are 
the same, i.e., if nX  is the same for all n , the subsidy levels under all programs will be 
the same, and the targeting schemes will be equivalent to each other. In this study, we 
simulate policy designs (1) and (3) for alternative subsidies under varying budgets C to 
assess the multiple environmental benefits generated by the policies. 
Costs and Environmental Amenities of Conservation Tillage Adoption 
In estimating the costs of adoption of conservation tillage nC , we draw on the work 
of Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao (2001), who present a methodology and empirical 
estimates of a reduced-form, discrete-choice adoption model for Iowa. Here, we briefly 
summarize this model and explain how we use it and then describe the physical process 
model, EPIC (Environmental Policy Integrated Climate), that we employ to simulate the 
environmental benefits associated with changes from conventional to conservation tillage 
(i.e., the nX ’s). These two models are used jointly to estimate the costs and amenities of 
adoption on some 12,143 NRI points for the state of Iowa. 
The Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao (2001) model is derived under the assumption that a 
farmer will adopt conservation tillage if the expected annual net return from conservation 
tillage exceeds that expected from conventional tillage plus a premium associated with 
uncertainty, which, in turn, depends on the variability of the net returns to conservation 
tillage and conventional tillage and other explanatory variables. In the model, the 
probability of adoption is expressed as a function of the production site’s physical and 
climatic characteristics, the crop grown, and farmer characteristics, as well as the 
expected net return to conventional tillage. In particular, the adoption probability 
is ( ) ( ),n n n np C p C s≡ , where vector ns  is a collection of producer-specific variables, and 
( )p i  is logistic. This adoption model is estimated on a random subsample of NRI points 
located in Iowa. 
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The basic data come from the 1992 NRI (USDA/NRCS 1994). The NRI data are 
statistically reliable for national, state, and multi-county analysis of nonfederal land 
(Nusser and Goebel 1997) and thus are reasonably representative of Iowa agricultural 
land. In our calculations, we treat each NRI point as representing a producer with a farm 
size equal to the number of acres represented by the point (the NRI expansion factor). 
The NRI provides information on the natural resource characteristics of the land and the 
crop grown (1992 and 1991 seasons). For additional information on the data source and 
model, see Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao (2001). 
The field-specific environmental benefits from conservation tillage ,KnX  1,..., ,k K=  
1,..., ,n N= are estimated at each of the data points using the EPIC model version 1015 
(Izaurralde et al. 2002)1. EPIC is a commonly used simulation model adaptable for large 
regional analyses (e.g., Plantinga and Wu 2003; Babcock et al. 1997). The simulations 
are carried out at a field-scale level for areas homogeneous in weather, soil, landscape, 
crop rotation, and management system parameters. EPIC operates on a continuous basis 
using a daily time step and is capable of simulating multiyear periods. The model 
accounts for the effects of tillage on surface residue, soil bulk density, and mixing of 
residue and nutrients in the soil plow layer. Version 1015 of EPIC includes an updated 
carbon simulation routine that is based on the approach used in the Century model 
developed by Parton et al. (1994).  
At each of the data points, two 30-year simulations are run, one assuming conven-
tional tillage and the other assuming conservation tillage. The NRI database provides 
baseline land use and other input data for the simulations. The quantities of the four 
environmental benefits—sequestered carbon, reduction in nitrogen runoff, reduction in 
wind erosion, and reduction in water erosion—are computed as the differences between 
appropriate EPIC outputs under conservation tillage and those under conventional tillage, 
averaged over the 30 years. 
 
Results 
We simulated the policies at 40 budget levels roughly corresponding to the amount 
of federal funding potentially available to Iowa through the CSP.2  Table 1 provides the 
environmental benefits creditable to the practice-based policy that targets conservation  
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TABLE 1. Multiple benefits of practice-based subsidy policy  
Budget 
(Mil $) 
Carbon 
Sequestered 
(1,000 Tons) 
Nitrogen 
Runoff 
Reduction 
(Tons) 
Water 
Erosion 
Reduction 
(Tons) 
Wind 
Erosion 
Reduction 
(Tons) 
2 41.309 59.494 156.13 163.11 
6 109.94 155.61 393.65 460.82 
10 169.46 236.74 597.49 704.02 
14 223.09 308.38 781.66 917.34 
18 272.47 374.55 951.39 1113.60 
22 318.33 436.03 1111.50 1294.30 
26 361.52 493.37 1260.80 1462.30 
30 402.13 547.35 1403.30 1618.30 
34 440.77 599.29 1538.00 1768.00 
38 477.60 647.88 1666.20 1908.30 
42 512.68 694.32 1788.80 2041.50 
46 546.28 738.55 1907.30 2168.30 
50 578.65 781.40 2020.20 2290.30 
54 609.85 822.64 2129.30 2407.10 
58 639.80 862.01 2234.30 2518.20 
62 668.75 900.41 2336.10 2625.30 
66 696.59 937.11 2433.60 2728.20 
70 723.55 972.60 2528.20 2828.30 
74 749.49 1006.80 2619.60 2923.10 
78 774.67 1040.00 2708.20 3015.30 
 
 
tillage. We found that such a policy can achieve carbon sequestration of around 0.169 
million tons of carbon at a total cost of $10 million, with the co-benefits of reduced 
nitrogen runoff of about 236.74 tons, reduced erosion of soil by water of about 597.49 
tons, and reduced soil erosion by wind of about 704.02 tons per year. As can be easily 
seen from Figure 1, the practice-based policy provides high proportions of the benefits 
obtainable from the policies that target the respective benefits. 
Figure 2 contrasts the environmental amenities from the practice-based targeting and 
carbon-sequestration-based targeting at two budget levels: $2 million and two times that  
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FIGURE 1. Benefits obtainable under practice-based policy as compared with results 
of direct targeting of benefits 
 
 
level—$4 million. As expected, targeting carbon leads directly to more total carbon and 
less land area in conservation tillage as compared to targeting conservation tillage. The 
amounts of other benefits change with the alternative policy designs. For instance, we 
found that targeting carbon increases the reduction in nitrogen runoff and the reduction in 
wind erosion and decreases the reduction in water erosion as compared to a practice-
based targeting.  
Additionally, the figure shows that the environmental benefits have a concave 
relation to the budget level: a doubling of the budget leads to less than a doubling of the 
physical quantities of the benefits. This is because the farmers that provide environmental 
amenities at the lowest costs are selected into the program first, with the more expensive 
benefits being provided as the budget increases. Thus, the amount of benefits grows as 
policy funding increases, but at a decreasing rate. 
To aid comparison of alternative targeting schemes, Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate 
how much less of a specific environmental benefit is obtained under a scheme that targets
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one of the other attributes, compared to the amount obtainable if this benefit were 
targeted directly. Figure 3 focuses on carbon, depicting the estimated proportion of 
carbon obtainable under alternative targeting schemes as compared to the amount of 
carbon obtainable when carbon is targeted, for varying budget levels. As expected, the 
proportions increase with the budget, as more and more farmers adopt conservation 
tillage and there is less room left for selectively choosing farmers into the program. At 
the extreme, when the budget level is adequate to enroll every farmer into the incentive 
payment program, targeting is no longer relevant for benefits obtained. But even at the 
lower, more realistic levels of the budget, more than 60 percent of the potentially 
obtainable carbon sequestration can be achieved in Iowa with the policies that target 
conservation tillage acreage or the other benefits in question. These results show that the 
farms are relatively homogenous in terms of the environmental benefits they can produce 
from their adoption of conservation tillage. 
Figure 4 represents similar information but in terms of the proportions of co-benefits 
obtainable under carbon targeting. We found that alternative targeting schemes still result 
in high proportions of the maximum benefits obtainable for all the three co-benefits of 
carbon sequestration considered: reductions in nitrogen runoff, in water-induced soil 
erosion, and in wind-induced soil erosion. However, as can be seen from Figures 3 and 4, 
the policy that targets conservation tillage seems to be the most “correlated” with the 
policy that targets carbon sequestration in the sense that targeting either one provides 
high proportions of the other attribute. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper compares the relative efficiency of alternative targeting schemes for least-
cost incentive policies that offer farmers subsides in return for adoption of conservation 
tillage. For the state of Iowa, the study provides estimates of the costs and benefits of 
policies that target conservation tillage acreage, carbon sequestration in agricultural soils, 
reduction in nitrogen runoff, reduction in water-induced soil erosion, and reduction of 
wind-induced soil erosion. We found that the least-cost policy that targets conservation 
tillage acreage provides high proportions of the four benefits relative to the policies that 
target the benefits directly, especially at higher budgetary levels of the policy. Similarly,  
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FIGURE 3. Carbon sequestered under alternatively targeted policies as compared 
with results of direct carbon targeting 
 
Figure 4. Land in conservation tillage and benefits under the carbon-targeting 
policy as compared with direct land or benefits targeting 
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we estimated that targeting one of the four benefits provides high percentages of the other 
benefits as compared with the amounts of the benefits obtainable if they were targeted 
directly.  
This finding implies that, especially when budgets are ample, there may be no need 
for implementation of performance-based subsidy policies for which monitoring costs are 
likely to be high. In this case, the variability of soil and weather characteristics in the 
region may be not high enough to justify the transaction costs to be incurred in the design 
and implementation of the subsidy policies that target any of the environmental benefits 
considered.  
It must be noted, however, that our results are not immediately transferable to areas 
outside of Iowa, as the findings reflect the unique variability of natural resources in the 
study region. Nor are the results applicable to agricultural practices other than 
conservation tillage, as correlations among the benefits may be different for other carbon-
friendly agricultural practices. 
We also note that the estimates of the costs and benefits of the policy designs depend 
on the estimates derived from the EPIC model. While the model is continuously 
improved and calibrated against controlled experimental data (e.g., Izaurralde et al. 
2002), physical process modeling errors are inevitable. A useful extension of our study 
would involve an analysis of sensitivity to EPIC simulation outcomes through, for 
example, Monte Carlo simulation methods. 
Finally, our results are obtained under an implicit assumption that the policymaker 
values at the same rate environmental benefits derived from different fields. As Antle and 
Mooney (2002) observe, this is likely to be a valid assumption when it pertains to the 
benefits of carbon sequestration for the reduction of greenhouse gases. Rephrasing Antle 
and Mooney, a ton of carbon sequestered in eastern Iowa is as good for battling the 
greenhouse effect as a ton of carbon sequestered in western Iowa. However, the benefits 
may be nonadditive when they are relevant to water quality: a reduction of nitrogen 
runoff close to a river may be more valuable to society than a reduction in nitrogen runoff 
from a field located miles from the nearest body of water. A follow-up study currently in 
the works accounts for the spatial nonadditivity of water-quality-related benefits by 
employing a physical simulation model that takes into account the spatial movement of 
nutrients and sediment in drainage areas.
  
Endnotes 
1. Earlier versions of EPIC were called the Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator 
(Williams 1990). 
2. The CSP of the 2002 farm legislation provides $2 billion for five years (U.S. Congress 
2002). Even if Iowa crop producers get as much as one-fifth of the yearly total, the 
program funding is limited to $80 million per year. 
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